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court in fact may not have jurisdiction absent some statutory pro-
cedure for providing service. If the plaintiff has no means to command
the defendant's appearance, then the saving statute should continue
to operate and preserve the plaintiff's action until the defendant is
amenable to the jurisdiction of the court.
In those states following the rule set forth in Vaughn, it appears
doubtful whether the decisions of the Supreme Court (or either type
of long-arm statute) will produce any change in the opinion of those
courts with regard to the application of the saving statute unless some
legislative change in the saving statute is made. The courts may, as
they have with the nonresident motorist statute, simply give full effect
to each since there is no conflict between the wording of the long-arm
statute and the saving statute.
40
The nonresident motorist statute and the more general long-arm
statutes have given plaintiffs a method of bringing their suits against
persons out of the state. Furthermore, these statutes work to rectify
the same inequity in statutes of limitations that the saving statutes
were designed to correct; i.e., under both the plaintiff will not lose
his cause of action against an out-of-state defendant. The saving statute
solves the problem by tolling the statute of limitations on such causes
of action until the defendant is within the forum state while the long-
arm type statutes permit the court to hear the plaintiff's case notwith-
standing the defendant's absence from the state. Since both statutes
are aimed at the same result, it would seem that the view taken by
the majority of the courts which have dealt with this problem is the
preferable one. Thus, courts should lay aside the saving statute so
long as the plaintiff has the opportuinty to bring his suit.
JAMES JULIUs WINN, JR.
IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
UPON IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN LEASES
Although the imposition of implied warranties of fitness in a leased
chattel has long been a recognized principle of common law,' many
courts have turned to the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act in order
40See cases cited note 14 supra.
"See, e.g., Eastern Motor Express, Inc. v. A. Maschmeijer, Jr., Inc., 247 F.2d 826
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1957); Marcos v. Texas Co., 75 Ariz. 45, 251
P.2d 647 (1952); Bass v. Cantor, 123 Ind. 444, 24 N.E. 147 (189o); Standard Oil
Co. v. Boyle, 231 App. Div. loi, 246 N.Y.S. 142 (193o).
[Vol. XXVI
CASE COMMENTS
to raise an implied warranty in a lease transaction.2 These courts, in
applying the Sales Act by analogy, looked to the underlying policy con-
siderations, and determined that the reasons for an implied warranty
in a lease transaction were similar to those in a sale. Prior to the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, an implied warranty in
both leases and sales could usually be negated by the inclusion of a
broad disclaimer.3 Since the Uniform Sales Act contained no provisions
governing disclaimer of warranties, the courts looked to the common
law in determining if a disclaimer were valid.4 The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, however, goes beyond the common law by requiring
that a disclaimer of implied warranty of fitness be conspicuous and
in writing.5 Although at common law the courts invalidated disclaim-
ers which were broad and ambiguous, it does not appear that any
went so far as to require that the disclaimer be conspicuous. The Code's
provision is intended to prevent a seller from abrogating both his
common law and Code duty to impliedly warrant his goods without
giving conscpicuous notice to the buyer.6 It would seem that the same
policy considerations should apply to a lessee-lessor relationship, since
the implied warranties in both leases and sales have a common origin.
Thus, there would appear to be no reason for having a double stand-
ard for leases and sales in disclaiming an implied warranty of fitness.
In Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp.,7 the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas held that section 85-2-316(2) of the Arkansas Commercial Code,s
-Holmes Packaging Mach. Corp. v. Bingham, 252 Cal. App. 2d 862, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (Ct. App. 1967); Boehck Const. Equip. Corp. v. H. Fuller 8- Sons, 19 Wis.
2d 658, 121 N.W.2d 303 (1963); cf. Hoisting Engine Sale Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 3o,
142 N.E. 342 (1923); Hlatten Mach. Co. v. Bruch, 59 Wash. 2d 757, 370 P.2d 600
(1962).
OSee, e.g., Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (ist Cir. 1962)
(applying Mass. and N.Y. law); Donnelly v. Governair Corp., 145 F. Supp. 699
(N.D. Cal. 1956); Traylor Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. National Container Corp., 45 Del.
143, 7o A.2d 9 (Super. Ct. 1949) (applying Pa. law); Nelson v. Swedish Hosp., 241
Minn. 551, 64 N.V.2d 38 (1954); Hyland v. GCA Tractor & Equip. Co., 274 Wis.
586, 80 N.W.2d 771 (1957). But see General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Shea, 187
Ark. 568, 61 S.W.2d 430 (1933) (applying N.Y. law); Standard Oil Co. v. Boyle, 231
App. Div. ioi, 246 N.Y.S. 142 (1930).
'See note 3 supra; Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d
51 (1945); Marks v. Kucich, 181 Wash. 73, 42 P.2d 16 (1935).
1
UNIFOaas COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (2).
OSee Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (196o);
Boehck Const. Equip. Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons, ig Wis. 2d 658, 121 N.W.2d 303
(1963).
7244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
'This section of the Arkansas Code is taken from UNIFORMI COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-316(2):
(2) Subject to subsection (3) ... to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
1969)
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which requires that any disclaimer of implied warranty of fitness be
both conspicuous and in writing, is "applicable to leases where the
provisions of the lease are analogous to a sale."9 Sawyer, an indepen-
dent grocer, had leased an ice machine from the Pioneer Leasing
Corporation in reliance upon representations as to its fitness for the
purpose for which Sawyer intended it to be used. The ice maker soon
ceased to function and after repeated attempts to repair the machine
had failed, Sawyer discontinued making the rental payments. When
Pioneer Leasing sued to recover the balance due under the lease,
Sawyer alleged a breach of implied warranty. Although the lease agree-
ment contained a disclaimer of all warranties, 10 the court held the
disclaimer to be invalid because of non-compliance with the Code re-
quirement of conspicuousness.
In extending section 2-316(2) of the UCC to leases, the court relied
upon an article by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 who was of the
opinion that implied warranties in general should not be limited to
sales. Professor Farnsworth used as a basis for his opinion an official
comment to the Uniform Commercial Code12 which states that the
sections on warranties, although limited in scope and purpose to a
seller-buyer situation, are not designed to limit in any way the de-
veloping case law which recognizes implied warranties in non-sale
transactions.13
The question of the applicability to a lease of a statutory pro-
vision, which is apparently intended to cover a sale situation, had
previously arisen under the Uniform Sales Act. Although this is a
novel question under the Uniform Commercial Code, the underlying
policy considerations governing implied warranties would seem to
9428 S.W.2d at 54.
IONo warranties or representations regarding the items herein leased or
their condition, quality or suitability, or their freedom from latent defects,
have been made or shall be deemed to be made by the Lessor, and Lessee
has selected the items leased and the same have been delivered to Lessee at
Lessee's sole risk and discretion.
428 S.W.2d at 47-48.
nFransworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L.
REv. 653 (1957).
1UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to war-
ranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract sale, the
warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need
not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a
contract.
"But see Justice Fogleman's dissent in Sawyer criticizing the extension of the
UCC to leases. 429 S.W.2d at 54.
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indicate identical results since the Sales Act is in many respects the
historical foundation for Article 2 of the Code.14
The issue of whether the Sales Act was applicable to a lease was
first raised in Hoisting Engine Sale Co. v. Hart.15 There, a derrick
collapsed and the lessor was held liable for property damage under
the theory of implied warranty. The court found the situation to be
similar to that of a sale, thus giving rise to an implied warranty of
fitness. However, the court deemed it unnecessary to consider the
direct application of the Sales Act and relied instead upon the com-
mon law development of implied warranties in leases. Thus, while
the court recognized a similarity in the underlying policy considera-
tions raised in both types of transactions, it did not incorporate the
lease under the Sales Act.
Later courts were persuaded by the agrument that the Sales Act
was to be strictly limited to sales transactions. In Boehck Construction
Equipment Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons,16 the Wisconsin supreme court
considered the applicability of the Sales Act in an action for breach
of an implied warranty involving a lease of construction equipment.
Here too, the court looked to the Sales Act but found it was not
directly applicable to the lease in question, saying: "the sales act does
not operate directly upon any lease which does not involve a contract
to transfer property in the goods."' 7 In holding the Sales Act to be
inapplicable, the court placed its emphasis on the fact that a "sale"
was not involved. However, it went on to note that although not
directly applicable, the Sales Act did in some instances represent a
declaration of the common law. Hence, the Sales Act's description of
the circumstances which would give rise to an implied warranty in
a sale was persuasive authority for the finding of an implied warranty
in a lease tranaction.
In a later case' 8 involving an action by a lessor to recover rent
due on a lease contract, the lessee pleaded the breach of an implied
warranty of fitness as a defense. It was urged that the Sales Act's pro-
vision governing implied warranties was controlling. The court held
"Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 785 (1953).
152 37 N.Y. 3o, 142 N.E. 342 (1923).
'19 Wis. 2d 658, 121 N.W.2d 303 (1963).
11Id. at 3o6.
"Holmes Packaging Mach. Corp. v. Bingham, 252 Cal. App. 2d 862, 6o Cal.
Rptr. 769 (Ct. App. 1967); accord, Hatten Mach. Co. v. Bruch, 59 Wash. 2d 757, 370
P.2d 6oo (1962).
1969]
378 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
that the section was limited to sales and was not directly applicable.
However, it went on ,to say:
[T]he implied warranties which are applicable in bailment
contracts are analogous to those applicable in sale transactions,
and we proceed to analyze the instant case within the ambit of
[Sales Act provisions] providing that goods be of merchantable
quality and that they be fit for the purpose for which they are
furnished. 19
In apparent agreement with Hoisting Engine and Boehck, the court,
in applying the Sales Act, looked to the underlying policy considera-
tions governing implied warranties. This approach would appear to
be consonant with the Code.20
The courts basing their decisions on the Sales Act have utilized
a "policy" approach in that they focused their attention on the
similarity of the underlying policy considerations between a lease and
a sale. This policy approach is advocated by Professor Farnsworth in
his article.21 Sawyer., on the other hand, utilized a categorical approach,
emphasizing the attributes of the transaction. Both approaches purport
to be analogies, but Sawyer uses the analogy as a vehicle to transform
a lease into a sale. Although relying extensively on the arguments of
Professor Farnsworth as to the use of analogy in a lease transaction,
the court apparently failed to recognize the advantages of the policy
approach. This policy approach makes it easier to adjust and readjust
legal principles to altering social conditions, thus avoiding the con-
fusion of declaring what was not a sale yesterday to be a sale today.
It also makes possible the extension of sales principles to transactions
which can not categorically be defined as sales but which should be
treated similarly, thereby focusing attention upon 'the reasons for
such an extension rather than emphasizing the category of the trans-
action. Sawyer makes the mistake of emphasizing the category of the
transaction instead of looking to the underlying policy consideration of
the Code provision.
Although there have been no other decisions which have extended
section 2-316(2) to leases, several courts have used the policy analogy
by applying Code principles to situations which the Code did not
purport to cover. Section 2-202, which deals with contractual integra-
"6o Cal. Rptr. at 775-76.
"'See note 12 supra; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(1).
"Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLuM. L.
REV. 653, 667-69 (1957); see Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for
Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLuM. L. REv. 88o (1965).
[Vol. XXVI
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tion, has been extended by analogy to cover investment securities.
22
Sections :2-614 and 2-615, which concern impossibility or impractic-
ability of performance and substituted performance, have been applied
by analogy to a contract for the carriage of goods.23 Additionally, sec-
tion 2-708(2), which provides for the recovery of overhead in certain
circumstances, has been applied to a contract which was not con-
trolled by the Code. 24
Sawyer utilized an analogy to categorize a lease as a sale and then
directly applied the Code. It appears that another possible approach
involving a direct application of the Code, but without the confusing
use of "analogy" was open to the court. An analysis of 'the Code in its
entirety indicates that the Code itself could be authority for an ex-
tension of Article 2 to certain leases.25 Sawyer limits its holding to
"leases where the provisions of the lease are analogous to a sale." Al-
though the court did not enumerate the criteria to be used in determin-
ing when a lease becomes analogous to a sale, it did emphasize several
factors which it considered to be of importance. The contract pro-
vided that the lessee should pay all expenses of repairs and mainte-
nance. Furthermore, the testimony revealed that the parties probably
intended that there was to be an option to purchase.26 Since the
Code should be read as an integrated body and not as nine separate
Articles, each an entity in itself,27 these representative facts are also
important in conjunction with Article 9, which purports to include
coverage of leases which are intended to create security agreements. 28
-Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 9o1 (D. Del. 1965); Hunt
Foods 9= Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966).
^3Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
-'The court held in allowing recovery for overhead that:
While this contract is not controlled by the Code, the Code is persuasive
here because it embodies the foremost modern legal thought concerning
commercial transactions. Indeed, it may overrule some of the cases denying
recovery for overhead.
Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 799 (3 d Cir. 1967).
'Justice Fogleman in his dissent points out an argument against this approach:
It is significant that when there is an intention that a lease is to be
covered by any of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, that
intention is given expression. [reference is made to sections 9-1o2(2); 1-
201(37); 9-io(i)(h)] This seems to be a very strong indication that no other
code provisions were intended to apply to leases under any circumstances.
428 S.W.2d at 55.
a'7The court found the transaction was very similar to a sale and distinguished it
from such, primarily because the lease contained a clause which required the lessee
to redeliver the leased chattel to the lessor upon the expiration of the term.
mHawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 531 (1963).
^T.JN1F0RM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(2).
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The general definition section of the Code serves as a guideline in
determining what is meant by a lease intended as a security agree-
ment.29 The cases which have interpreted sections 9-1o(2) and i-
201(37) have emphasized the presence of an option to purchase the
leased chattel as evidence of the parties' intention to create a security
interest2 0 The consideration for the purchase must be nominal, or
at least considerably less than the market value of the chattel at the
time the option is executed.3 '
Courts have not hesitated to pierce the wording of an agreement
which purports to be a lease in finding that the "lease" is actually a
conditional sale.32 When the lease is really a financing arrangement,
especially in situations similiar to that in Sawyer33 where the lessor
has no property to lease and merely intends to supply and finance
the chattel at a profit, the courts have found the contract to create
a security interest.
34
When Article 9 and the definitional material are read in con-
junction with the cases interpreting these sections, the purported
"lease" in Sawyer may actually have been a conditional sale, with the
lessor, Pioneer Leasing, retaining a security interest in the unpaid
balance. Under Article 9 a conditional sale is treated as a purchase
money security interest.3 5 Although Article 2 purports to exclude trans-
actions which are intended to operate solely as a security interest, 30
it does regulate the sale aspects of such transactions. 37 In fact, Article
9 specifically states that where a purchase money security interest is
involved, Article 2 "governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation
or modification of the seller's warranties."38 Under this analysis, a
conditional sale which takes the form of a lease is governed by the
9UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37).
-"See Sanders v. National Acceptance Co. of America, 383 F.2d 6o6 (5 th Cir.
1967); In re Overbrook & Barson's, Inc., 5 UCC REP. SERV. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1968); In re
Washington Processing Co., 3 UCC REP. SERv. 475 (S.D. Calif. 1966); In re Atlanta
Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
-"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37); see In re Falco Prods. Co., 5 UCC
REP. SERv. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1968); In re Wheatland Elec. Prods. Co., 237 F. Supp. 820
(W.D. Pa. 1964).
12See Sanders v. Commercial Credit Corp., 398 F.2d 988 (sth Cir. 1968); In re
Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1082 (E.D. Pa. 1967); In re Merkel,
Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 753, 258 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
13428 S.W.2d at 49.
3'In re Transcontinental Indus., Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965);
accord, In re Pomona Valley Inn, 4 UCC RE. SERV. 893 (C.D. Calif. 1967).
3UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107(b).
nUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102.
117UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102, Comment.
-"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-206(2).
[Vol. XXVI
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provisions of Article 2 as to warranties and any other sale aspect of
the transaction. This approach, however, can only be used when the
"lease" is actually a conditional sale. Neither this approach nor
Sawyer's transaction analogy covers a bona fide lease which does not
possess the attributes of a sale. This latter type of lease should not
be excluded from the application of the Code merely because of a
categorical distinction when the underlying policy considerations are
the same. It would therefore appear that where the lease is not a
conditional sale, the best approach in applying the Code would be
the analogy approach which emphasizes the underlying policy con-
siderations.
Although Sawyer has provided subsequent courts with a starting
point in facing the issue of when the Code should be applied to a
lease transaction, the decision raises numerous questions. While the
court limits its holding to "leases the provisions of which are analo-
gous to a sale," it fails to enumerate the criteria for determining when
the provisions do become analogous. 39 By so limiting its decision,
Sawyer may have excluded many leases which have analogous under-
lying policy considerations but do not fulfill the requirement of being
analogous to a sale. This appears to be an artificial limitation which
ignores the advantages of the analogy approach.
In any further extension of Sawyer, courts may be faced with the
possibility of overruling by implication or seriously undermining
previous cases which have used the underlying policy consideration
of the Sales Act analogy. Prior to the adoption of the UCC, courts
referred to the Sales Act not only in raising implied warranties by
analogy40 but also for direct authority in their interpretation and
decisions. In some instances the Code has incorporated the provisions
of the Sales Act.4 1 However, there are several sections where the pro-
visions of the Sales Act and the Code are different. The Sales Act pro-
"'Justice Fogeman in his dissent criticizes this shortcoming in the decision: "I
cannot tell, and it is not suggested, when a lease of personal property is analogous
to a sale." 428 S.W.2d at 56.
"See note 2 supra.
"For example, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-6o7(3)(a) requires that a buyer
must within reasonable time give notice to the seller of any breach of warranty
or be barred from any remedy. The UNIFORM SALEs Acr § 49 also requires notice of
any breach of warranty, and courts have applied the Act's requirement by analogy
in requiring that notice be given to a lessor before the lessee can recover for a breach
of warranty. Boehck Const. Equip. Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons, x9 Wis. 2d 658, 121
N.W.2d 3o3 (1963); see Tuttle v. Irvine Const. Co.'s Receiver, 253 Ky. 538, 69 S.W.2d
1034 (1934).
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vision that a sale of a specified article under its patent or tradename
would not raise an implied warranty of fitness has, by analogy, been
applied to a lease transaction. 42 This limitation is absent from the
Code. If the Code is ,to be further extended with regard to leases, these
previous cases, now part of our common law, would either no longer
be controlling or their value as precedent seriously undermined.
The Code also provides a guideline for construing the cumulation
or conflict of warranties. 43 Pre-Code cases have held that the inclusion
of an express warranty in a bailment contract does not negate the
existence of an implied warranty of fitness unless the express warranty
is inconsistent with the implied warranty.4 4 Under the Code even
an inconsistent express warranty cannot exclude or modify an implied
warranty of fitness. 4 5 Although it is difficult to visualize an express
warranty which would be inconsistent with an implied warranty of
fitness, the problem might arise where a lessor gives an express war-
ranty in lieu of all other warranties. If these words are not sufficient
to constitute a disclaimer under section 2-316, then an implied war-
ranty of fitness would still arise notwithstanding the inconsistent ex-
press warranty.
Another divergent point between case law involving leases and
the Code is the importance of an opportunity to inspect the chattel
before consummation of the contract. In a lease transaction, where the
lessee has had either the opportunity of inspecting or has inspected
the chattel before taking possession, there has been no implied war-
ranty of fitness.46 The only limitation under the Code is that there is
no implied warranty of fitness "where the buyer before entering into
the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods....,47 Thus, the
4-Demos Const. Co. v. Service Supply Corp., 153 Pa. Super. 623, 34 A.2d 828
(1943); accord, Pennsylvania R.R. v. J. Jacob Shannon & Co., 363 Pa. 438, 7o A.2d
321 (1950)-
43UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-317.
"Hartford Battery Sales Corp. v. Price, 119 Pa. Super. 165, 181 A. 95, 98 (1935)
(relying on Uniform Sales Act § 15); see Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. Builders' Equip.
& Supplies Co., 347 Mass. 636, 199 N.E.2d 519, 525 (1964).
4"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-317(c); see L & N Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa.
Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
'0Schmidt-Hitchcock Contractors v. Dunning, 38 Ariz. 360, 300 P. 183 (1931);
see Electrical Advertising, Inc. v. Sakato, 94 Ariz. 68, 381 P.2d 755 (1963)) (no
opportunity to inspect); Marcos v. Texas Co., 75 Ariz. 45, 251 P. ad 647 (1952) (no
opportunity to inspect). But see Ekco Prods. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 768
(Ct. Cl. 1963).
47UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-3 16(3)(b).
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mere opportunity to inspect would not negate an implied warranty
of fitness.
4 8
The measure of damages for breach of warranty arising out of both
a sale under the Code and a lease transaction appears to be very
similar4 9 However, a problem might arise regarding the statute of
limitations upon which the cause of action is predicated. The Code
provides that an action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.50
In Arkansas, an action for breach of an express warranty must be com-
menced within five years, 51 while the statute of limitations for an action
upon the breach of an implied warranty is three years.52 Thus, statutes
of limitations may become an important issue if a court applies the
Code to either raise or construe a warranty arising from a lease trans-
action.
Although Sawyer specifically limits its decision to disclaimer of
implied warranties under Section 2-316(2), it seems likely that other
courts will also look to the Code in construing warranties in lease con-
tracts. Since the Code departs from the common law in many sections,
it would appear that the courts should adopt guidelines in applying
Code sections to leases. The Sawyer approach, which emphasizes the
attributes of the transactions, is not an entirely satisfactory solution.
This method excludes many leases which do not have the external
characteristics of a sale but do have similar policy considerations. It
is possible that the court was not actually aware of the artificial
limitation it imposed as it apparently failed to recognize and make use
of the advantages which are offered by the analogy approach.
D. WHITNEY THORNTON, II
"UNIrORM COIMMERCIAL CODE § 2-3 1%6(3)(b), comment 8.
"Compare UNIFORMI COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-714(2), 2-715 with Motion Pictures
for Television, Inc. v. North Dakota Broadcasting Co., 87 NAV.2d 731 (N.D. 1958)
and Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (q965).
f°UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725.
"ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-209 (Repl. Vol. 1962); see Louisville Silo & Tank Co. v.
Thweatt, 174 Ark. 437, 295 SAV. 710 (1927).
OARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-2o6 (Repl. Vol. 1962); see Scroggin Farms Corp. v. Howell,
216 Ark 569, 226 S.V.2d 562 (195o).
